Since the advent of SPECTRE, a number of countermeasures have been proposed and deployed. Rigorously reasoning about their effectiveness, however, requires a well-defined notion of security against speculative execution attacks, which has been missing until now.
I. INTRODUCTION
Speculative execution avoids expensive pipeline stalls by predicting the outcome of branching (and other) decisions, and by speculatively executing the corresponding instructions. If a prediction turns out to be wrong, the CPU aborts the speculative execution and rolls back the effect of the speculatively executed instructions on the logical state, which consists of the CPU's registers and flags as well as the memory.
However, the speculative execution's effect on the microarchitectural state, which comprises the content of the cache, is not (or only partially) rolled back. This side-effect can leak information about the speculatively accessed data and thus violate confidentiality. The family of SPECTRE attacks [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] demonstrates that the vulnerability affects all modern general-purpose CPUs and poses a serious threat against platforms with multiple tenants.
Since the advent of SPECTRE, a number of countermeasures have been proposed and deployed. These include, for instance, the insertion of serializing instructions [7] , the use of branchless bounds checks [8] , and speculative load hardening [9] . Several compilers support the automated insertion of these countermeasures during compilation [10] , [11] , [12] , and the first static analyses to help identify vulnerable code patterns are emerging [13] .
However, we still lack a precise characterization of security against speculative execution attacks. Such a characterization is a prerequisite for reasoning about the effectiveness of countermeasures, and for making principled decisions about their placement. It would enable one, for example, to identify cases where countermeasures do not prevent all attacks or are unnecessary.
Our Approach: We develop a novel, principled approach for detecting information flows introduced by speculative execution, and for reasoning about software defenses against SPECTRE-style attacks. Our approach is backed by a semantic notion of security against speculative execution attacks, and it comes with an algorithm, based on symbolic execution, for proving the absence of speculative leaks.
Defining security: The foundation of our approach is speculative non-interference, a novel semantic notion of security against speculative execution attacks. Speculative noninterference is based on comparing a program with respect to two different semantics:
• The first is a standard semantics without speculative execution. We use this semantics as a proxy for the intended program behavior.
• The second is a novel, speculative semantics, which can follow mispredicted branches for a bounded number of steps before backtracking. We use this semantics for capturing the effect of speculatively executed instructions.
In a nutshell, speculative non-interference requires that speculatively executed instructions do not leak more information into the microarchitectural state than what the intended behavior does, i.e., than what is leaked by the standard semantics.
For capturing "leakage into the microarchitectural state", we consider an observer of the program execution that sees the locations of memory accesses and jump targets. This is a common way of characterizing "side-channel free" or "constant-time" code [14] , [15] in the absence of detailed models of the microarchitecture. We characterize what this observer can learn in terms of an equivalence relation over initial program states, where a finer relation distinguishes between more states and corresponds to more leakage [16] .
Formally, speculative non-interference requires that the relation characterizing the leak in the speculative semantics does not refine the relation characterizing the leak in the standard semantics.
Automation: We propose SPECTECTOR, a novel technique for automatically proving that programs are speculatively non-interferent. Given a program p, SPECTECTOR uses symbolic execution with respect to the speculative semantics to derive a concise representation of the trace of all mem-1 if (y < size) 2 temp &= B[A[y] * 512]; Fig. 1 . SPECTRE variant 1 -C code ory accesses and jump targets during execution along each program path. Based on this representation, SPECTECTOR creates a SMT formula that describes that, whenever two initial states produce the same memory access patterns in the standard semantics, they also produce the same access patterns in the speculative semantics. Validity of this formula for each program path implies speculative noninterference.
Case studies: We implement a prototype of SPECTEC-TOR, with the Z3 SMT solver as a back-end for analysing formulae and a front-end for parsing (a subset of) x86 assembly. 1 We perform a case study where we run this prototype on a corpus of 210 small example programs. These programs are obtained by compiling the 15 variants of SPECTRE v1 by Kocher [17] with the CLANG, INTEL ICC, and Microsoft VISUAL C++ compilers, using different levels of optimization and protection against SPECTRE.
Using SPECTECTOR, we successfully (1) detect all leaks pointed out in [17] , (2) detect novel, subtle leaks that are out of scope of existing approaches that check for known vulnerable code patterns [13] , and (3) identify cases where compilers unnecessarily inject countermeasures, i.e., opportunities for optimiziation without sacrificing security.
Scope: Our work focuses on detecting leaks introduced by speculatively executed instructions resulting from mispredicted branch outcomes. That is, we focus on SPECTRE v1 [2] and its variants. Generalizing speculative non-interference (and SPECTECTOR) to other forms of speculation, such as indirect jump predictors [2] , return stack buffers [1] , and memory disambiguation predictors [18] will require extending the speculative semantics (and the symbolic execution engine) accordingly. For a more in-depth discussion of the scope of our approach, see Section VIII.
Summary of contributions: Our contributions are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, we present speculative non-interference, the first semantic notion of security against speculative execution attacks. On the practical side, we develop SPECTECTOR, an automated technique for detecting speculative leaks (or prove their absence), and we use it to detect subtle leaks -and optimization opportunities -in the way three state-of-the-art compilers inject SPECTRE countermeasures.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate our approach, we show how SPECTECTOR applies to the SPECTRE v1 example [2] shown in Figure 1 . Spectre v1. The program checks whether the index stored in the variable y is less than the size of the array A, stored in the variable size. If that is the case, the program retrieves A[y], 1 SPECTECTOR is available at https://spectector.github.io. If size is not cached, evaluating the branching condition requires traditional CPUs to wait until size is fetched from the main memory. Modern CPUs instead speculate on the condition's outcome and continue the computation. The memory accesses in lines 2 may therefore be executed even if y ≥ size.
When size becomes available, the CPU checks whether the speculated branch is the correct one. If it is not, the CPU rolls back the architectural state's changes and executes the correct branch. However, the speculatively executed memory accesses leave a footprint in the cache, which enables an attacker to retrieve A[y], even for y ≥ size, by probing the array B. Detecting Leaks with SPECTECTOR. SPECTECTOR automatically detects leaks introduced by speculatively executed instructions, or proves their absence. The distinguishing feature of SPECTECTOR is that it is backed by a sematic notion of security. Specifically, SPECTECTOR detects a leak whenever executing the program under a speculative semantics, which captures that the execution can go down a mispredicted path for a bounded number of steps, leaks more information into the microarchitecture than executing the program under a simple, non-speculative semantics.
For illustrating how SPECTECTOR operates, we consider the translation of the program in Figure 1 into x86 assembly 2 , see Figure 2 .
SPECTECTOR performs symbolic execution with respect to the speculative semantics to derive a concise representation of the trace of memory accesses and program counter values along each path of the program. These symbolic traces capture the program's effect on the microarchitectural state.
The code in Figure 2 yields two symbolic traces with respect to the speculative semantics: 3 start · rollback · τ when y < size (1)
where τ = loadO (A + y) · loadO (B + A[y] * 512).
Here, the argument of loadO is visible to the observer, while start and rollback denote the start and the end of a mis-speculated execution. The traces of the non-speculative semantics are obtained from those of the speculative semantics by removing all observations in-between start and rollback. Trace 1 shows that whenever y is in bounds (i.e., y < size) the observations of the speculative semantics and the non-speculative semantics coincide (i.e. they are both τ ).
In contrast, trace 2 shows that whenever y ≥ size, the speculative execution generates observations τ that depend on variables (here: A[y]) that are not visible in the standard execution. This is flagged as a leak by SPECTECTOR.
Proving Security with SPECTECTOR. The CLANG 7.0.0 C++ compiler implements a countermeasure, called speculative load hardening [9] , that applies conditional masks to addresses to prevent leaks into the microarchitectural state. Figure 3 depicts the protected output of CLANG on the program from Figure 1 The symbolic execution of the speculative semantics produces, as before, trace 1 and trace 2, but with
where mask = ite(y < size, 0x0, 0xFF..FF) corresponds to the conditional move in line 6 and | is a bitwise-or operator. Here, ite(y < size, 0x0, 0xFF..FF) is a symbolic if-then-else expression evaluating to 0x0 if y < size and to 0xFF..FF otherwise.
The analysis of trace 1 is as before. For trace 2, however, SPECTECTOR determines (via a query to Z3 [19] ) that, for all y ≥ size -which we assume is public -there is exactly one observation that the attacker can make in the speculation, namely loadO (A+y)·loadO (B+0xFF..FF), from which we conclude that no information leaks into the microarchitectural state, i.e., the countermeasure is securely applied. See Section VII for examples where SPECTECTOR detects that this is not the case.
III. LANGUAGE AND SEMANTICS
Here, we introduce µASM, a simple language capturing the main aspects of assembler languages.
Basic Types
µASM, whose syntax is defined in Figure 4 , supports eight kinds of instructions: skip instructions, assignments, load and store instructions, branching instructions, indirect jumps, conditional updates, and speculation barriers. Both conditional updates and speculation barriers have been used to implement SPECTRE countermeasures [9] , [7] .
Assignments are of the form x ← e, where x is a register and e an expression on registers. µASM features two memory access instructions. A load x, e instruction accesses memory at the address specified by the expression e and saves the memory's content in the register x. In contrast, a store x, e instruction stores the content of the register x in the memory address pointed by the expression e. Branching is supported through the beqz x, n instruction, which sets the program counter to the value n in case the value stored in the register x is 0. In contrast, indirect jumps are supported using the jmp e instruction, which sets the program counter to the value of the expression e. A conditional update x e ← − e assigns to x the value of e only if the value of the expression e is 0. Finally, a speculation barrier spbarr stops speculative execution; otherwise it has no effect.
A µASM program is a sequence of pairs n : i, where n ∈ Vals is a value representing the instruction's label and i is an instruction. A program is well-formed if (1) it contains no duplicate labels, (2) it contains an instruction labeled with 0, i.e., the initial instruction, (3) it does not contain instructions labelled with the designated label ⊥, which we use to denote termination, and (4) it does not contain instructions n : beqz x, n + 1. In the following we consider only wellformed programs. Given a program p and a value n ∈ Vals, we denote by p(n) the instruction labelled with n in p if it exists and ⊥ otherwise, i.e., we treat p as a partial function from values to instruction.
B. Non-speculative semantics
Here, we formalize the standard, non-speculative semantics for µASM programs. This semantics models the behavior of µASM programs executed on a very simple microarchitecture that ignores speculative execution.
Notation. By Regs we denote the set of register identifiers, which contains a designated identifier pc representing the program counter register. µASM programs compute on natural numbers only. Hence, the set Vals of all values consists of the natural numbers and the designated value ⊥, which we use to denote termination.
We use standard notation for sequences. Given a set S, S * is the set of all finite sequences over S. We also denote by ε the empty sequence and by s 1 · s 2 the concatenation of s 1 and s 2 .
Configurations.
A memory m ∈ Mem is a function mapping memory addresses, which we represent by natural numbers, to values. In contrast, a register assignment a ∈ Assgn is a function mapping register identifiers to values. We assume that the designated value ⊥ can be assigned only to the program counter register pc.
A configuration σ is a pair m, a ∈ Mem × Assgn, where m is the current memory and a records the values stored in the registers. Observe that a(pc) stores the current value of the program counter, which points to the next instruction to be executed. The set Conf of all configurations is Mem × Assgn. A configuration m, a is initial (respectively final) if the program counter in a is 0 (respectively ⊥).
Observations. We consider an attacker that observes the current program counter as well as the location of memory accesses. We capture this by annotating the transactions in our semantics with observations o ∈ Obs. Observations loadO n and storeO n record memory accesses to an address n and are produced by load and store instructions. Observations pcO n, produced by jmp and beqz instructions, record changes to the program counter.
Evaluation relation. We capture the µASM semantics with the evaluation relation − →⊆ Conf × Obs × Conf, which is fully formalized in Appendix A. Most of the rules defining − → are rather standard. Figure 5 depicts some selected rules.
The rule CONDITIONALUPDATE-1 models the behavior of a conditional update whose condition is satisfied. It checks that the condition e evaluates to 0 under the current register assignment, written e (a) = 0. The rule updates the assignment a by storing the new value associated with the register x and increments the program counter.
The rules LOAD and STORE handle memory accesses. The former assigns to the register x the memory content at the address pointed by e. The latter stores x's content at the memory location pointed by e. The rules increment the program counter and record memory accesses using observations.
The rule BEQZ-1 handles branching instructions beqz x, n. It checks that x's values is 0 and sets the program counter to n. It also records the changes to the program counter by producing the observation pcO n. A corresponding rule BEQZ-2 found in Appendix A handles the case in which the branch is not taken. Finally, the rule JMP executes jmp e instructions. The rule stores e's value in the program counter and records the change using an observation. In the above program, the variables y, size, and temp are assumed to be kept in registers y, size, and temp. Similarly, the two registers A and B store the memory addresses of the first elements of the arrays A and B.
IV. SPECULATIVE SEMANTICS
Here, we formalize the behavior of µASM programs executed by a microarchitecture supporting a simple form of speculative execution. Speculative states. A speculative transaction consists of all the instructions that are executed between the time when the CPU predicts a branching decision and when the CPU realizes whether its prediction was correct. We associate each speculative transaction with a unique identifier id ∈ N.
Whenever a speculative transaction starts, the semantics records the prediction's outcome and the current configuration that may need to be restored. A speculative snapshot is a 4-tuple id , w, n, σ ∈ N × N × Vals × Conf where id is the speculative transaction's identifier, w indicates the remaining speculative window, n indicates the predicted next instruction's address, and σ is the configuration that should be restored in case the speculative execution is rolled back.
A speculative state s ∈ SpecS is a sequence of snapshots. Executing commands inside a speculative transaction reduces the remaining speculative window. We model this with the function decr : SpecS → SpecS which takes a speculative state s and decrements all of its speculative windows by 1.
The speculative semantics performs a computation step only in case all the remaining speculative windows are greater than 0. When a speculative window reaches 0, the speculative transaction is either commited or rolled back. The predicate enabled (s) denotes that all speculative windows in the state s are greater than 0. Extended configurations. The speculative semantics operates on extended configurations which are triples ctr , σ, s ∈ ExtConf consisting of a global counter ctr ∈ N to generate speculative transactions' identifiers, a configuration σ ∈ Conf, and a speculative state s ∈ SpecS . Extended observations. To model the speculative execution's effects, we introduce new observations. We extend the set Obs with observations of the form start id , commit id , and rollback id , where id ∈ N is a speculative transaction's identifier, that denote a transaction's start, commit, and rollback. ExtObs denotes the set of extended observations. Prediction oracle. Our goal is to model the security-critical features of speculative execution. To this end, we abstract away from internal details of branch predictors implemented in CPUs, and we model them as prediction oracles.
A prediction oracle O is a partial function that takes as input a configuration σ and a program p and returns as output a pair n, w ∈ Vals × N, where n is the predicted next instruction's label and w is the speculation window indicating the number of steps that should be executed speculatively. We consider only oracles O that are defined only if the current instruction pointed by pc is a branch instruction. That is, our semantics only speculates over branch outcomes.
Example 2. The "backward taken forward not taken" (BTFNT) branch predictor, which predicts the branch as taken if the target instruction address is lower than the program counter, implemented in early CPUs [20] can be formalized as a simple oracle BTFNT , for a fixed speculative window w: BTFNT ( m, a , p) is a(pc) + 1, w whenever p(a(pc)) = beqz x, n and n > a(pc), and n, w otherwise.
Example 3. Another security-relevant oracle is the "always mispredict" oracle, which mispredicts the outcome of every branch instruction. Using this oracle, we always speculatively execute the instructions in the wrong branch before backtracking and executing the instructions in the correct branch. The "always mispredict" oracle has already been implicitly used in previous SPECTRE detection techniques [13] . SPECTECTOR also relies on an "always mispredict" oracle, as it is often the worst predictor in terms of leaked information.
Evaluation relation. The speculative semantics of a program p under a prediction oracle O is modeled by the relation ⊆ ExtConf × ExtObs * × ExtConf defined in Figure 6 .
The rule SE-NOBRANCH executes non-branching instructions, i.e., O(σ, p) = ⊥, as long as no speculative window has reached 0, that is, if enabled (s). In this case, simply mimics the behavior of the non-speculative semantics − →. If the instruction is not a speculation barrier, the rule also decrements the speculation windows in the speculative state. In contrast, speculation barriers spbarr stop the speculative execution. We formalize this by setting to 0 the speculation window of all snapshots in the current speculative state using the function zeroes : SpecS → SpecS . That is, spbarr forces the termination (either with a commit or with a rollback) of all on-going speculative transactions.
The rule SE-BRANCH models the behavior of branch in-structions, i.e., those for which O(σ, p) = ⊥. The rule (1) queries the prediction oracle O to obtain a prediction n, w consisting of the predicted next instruction address n and the speculation window n, (2) sets the program counter to n, (3) decrements the speculation windows in s, (4) increments the transaction counter ctr , and (5) appends a new snapshot with identifier ctr recording the speculative window w, the predicted instruction address n, and the current configuration σ. The rule also records the speculative execution's start and the program counter's change through observations. The rule SE-COMMIT commits a speculative transaction. The rule is executed only when there is a speculative snapshot whose remaining speculative window has reached 0. The rule ensures that the prediction made for the transaction is correct by comparing the predicted address n with the one obtained by executing one step of the non-speculative semantics starting from the configuration σ . The rule records the transaction's commit through observations.
In contrast, the rule SE-ROLLBACK rolls back a speculative transaction. The rule checks that the prediction is incorrect (again by comparing the predicted address n with the one obtained from the non-speculative semantics), and it restores the configuration stored in s. Rolling back a transaction in the middle of the speculative state also terminates the speculative execution of all the nested transactions. This is modeled by dropping the portion s of the speculative state associated with the nested transactions. The rule also produces observations recording the speculative execution's rollback and the program counter's change.
Example 4. Let us now execute the program from Example 1 with the "always mispredict" oracle from Example 3. Consider an initial configuration 0, m, a , ε in which a(y) is greater than a(size). Executing the program produces the trace τ :
First, the rule SE-NOJUMP is applied to execute the assignment x ← y ≥ size. Then, the branch instruction beqz x, 3 is reached and so rule SE-JUMP applies. The rule queries the "always mispredict" oracle, which predicts that the branch is not taken. This produces the observations start 0, modeling the beginning of a speculative transaction, and pcO 3, representing the program counter's change. Next, we apply the rule SE-NOJUMP three times to execute the instructions 3-6, thereby producing the observations loadO v 1 and loadO v 2 that record the memory accesses. Finally, the rule SE-ROLLBACK applies, which terminates the speculative transaction and rolls back its effects. This rule produces the observations rollback 0 and pcO ⊥.
Runs. Runs are triples σ, τ, σ consisting of an initial configuration σ, a trace of observations τ , and a final configuration σ . Given a program p and an oracle O, we denote by p, O the set of all possible runs of the speculative semantics, i.e., it contains all triples σ, τ, σ corresponding to runs 0, σ, ε τ * ctr , σ , ε . Similarly, p − → denotes the set of all possible runs of the non-speculative semantics, i.e., it contains all triples σ, τ, σ corresponding to runs σ τ − → * σ .
Projections. Given a trace τ produced by the speculative semantics, its non-speculative projection contains only the observations that are produced by committed transactions or that are produced non-speculatively; in other words, rolledback transactions are removed in the projection. Formally, the non-speculative projection τ nse is the trace obtained by removing from τ (1) all substrings start id · τ · rollback id , and (2) all the remaining extended observations.
In contrast, τ 's speculative projection τ se contains all the observations produced by rolled-back transactions. That is, τ se is obtained by concatenating all the substrings τ discarded by τ nse , i.e., those for which there is a maximal substring start id · τ · rollback id in τ .
We formalize both τ nse and τ se in Appendix B.
Speculative and non-speculative semantics. The speculative and non-speculative semantics are tightly connected. As stated in Proposition 1, every speculative run σ, τ, σ ∈ p, O corresponds to a non-speculative run σ, τ , σ ∈ p − → such that τ agrees with τ 's non-speculative projection, and vice versa. That is, from a speculative run σ, τ, σ one can recover the program's non-speculative behavior by ignoring the speculative observations, i.e., by computing τ nse . Proposition 1. Let p be a program and O be an oracle.
Here, we define a semantic notion of security characterizing leaks caused by speculative execution.
Security Policy. Our notion is parameterized by a security policy P specifying which parts of the state are known or controlled by an adversary, i.e., "public" or "low" data. Formally, P is a finite subset of Regs ∪ N specifying the nonsensitive register identifiers and memory addresses.
Two configurations σ, σ ∈ Conf are indistinguishable with respect to a policy P , written σ ∼ P σ , iff they agree on all registers and memory locations in P .
Example 5. A policy P for the program from Example 1 may state that the content of the registers y, size, A, and B is non-sensitive, i.e., P = {y, size, A, B}.
Policies need not be manually specified but can in principle be inferred from the context in which a piece of code executes, e.g., whether a variable is reachable from public input or not.
Attacker Knowledge. We characterize what attackers can infer from an execution in terms of their knowledge, which is commonly defined as the set of all possible initial configurations that are coherent with their observations [21] . Definition 1 formalizes knowledge with respect to the speculative and non-speculative semantics. Definition 1. Let p be a program and O be an oracle.
• The speculative knowledge K (τ, σ, P ), given a sequence of observations τ ∈ ExtObs * , an initial configuration σ, and a policy P , is the set of configurations
, given a sequence of observations τ ∈ Obs * , an initial configuration σ, and a policy P , is the set of configurations
Defining speculative non-interference. Informally, speculative non-interference requires that executing a program under the speculative semantics leaks at most as much information as executing the program under the non-speculative semantics.
Formally, we require that the non-speculative knowledge is always contained in the speculative knowledge. In contrast, the non-speculative projection of τ is τ nse = ε and the non-speculative knowledge K − → (τ nse , σ, P ) is { m 0 , a 0 ∈ InitConf | a(y) = a 0 (y)∧a(size) = a 0 (size)∧a(A) = a 0 (A) ∧ a(B) = a 0 (B) ∧ a(y) ≥ a(size)}. Therefore, p does not satisfy speculative non-interference since K − → (τ nse , σ, P ) ⊆ K (τ, σ, P ).
VI. DETECTING SPECULATIVE INFORMATION FLOWS
We now present SPECTECTOR, an approach to automatically check speculative non-interference, i.e., to detect speculative leaks or to prove their absence. SPECTECTOR relies on symbolic execution of the program p under analysis to derive a concise representation of p's behavior as a set of symbolic As prediction oracle, SPECTECTOR relies on the "always mispredict" oracle from Example 3 for a given speculative window w, which we fix for the rest of the section.
A. Symbolically executing µASM programs
Here, we define a symbolic semantics for µASM programs. The goal of our symbolic semantics is to concisely represent all possible concrete traces that can be produced by a program. Symbolic expressions. Symbolic expressions represent computations over symbolic values. A symbolic expression se is a concrete value n ∈ Vals, a symbolic value s ∈ SymbVals, an if-then-else expression ite(se, se , se ), or the application of a unary operator se or a binary operator se ⊗ se .
The value of an expression se depends on a model µ : SymbVals → Vals mapping symbolic values to concrete ones. The evaluation µ(se) of se under µ is standard, and we formalize it in Appendix C. An expression se is satisfiable if there is a model µ such that µ(se) = 0. Symbolic memories. We model symbolic memories as symbolic arrays using the standard theory of arrays [22] . That is, we model memory updates as triples of the from write(sm, se, se ), which updates the symbolic memory sm by assigning the symbolic value se to the symbolic location se, and memory reads as read(sm, se), which denote retrieving the value assigned to the symbolic expression se.
A symbolic memory sm is either a function mem : N → SymbVals mapping memory addresses to symbolic values or a term write(sm, se, se ), where sm is a symbolic memory and se, se are symbolic expressions. To account for symbolic memories, we extend symbolic expressions with terms of the form read(sm, se), where sm is a symbolic memory and se is a symbolic expression, representing memory reads.
sm := mem | write(sm, se, se ) se := . . . | read(sm, se) Symbolic assignments. A symbolic assignment sa is a function mapping register identifiers to symbolic expressions sa : Regs → SymbExprs. Given a symbolic assignment sa and a model µ, µ(sa) denotes the assignment µ • sa. We assume the program counter pc to always be concrete, i.e., sa(pc) is always a value in Vals.
Symbolic configurations.
A symbolic configuration is a pair sm, sa consisting of a symbolic memory sm and a symbolic assignment sa. We lift speculative snapshots and speculative states to symbolic configurations. A symbolic extended configuration is a triple ctr , σ, s where ctr ∈ N is a counter, σ ∈ Conf is a symbolic configuration, and s is a symbolic speculative state.
Symbolic observations. When symbolically executing a program, we may produce observations whose value is symbolic. To account for this, we introduce symbolic observations of the form loadO se and storeO se, which are produced when symbolically executing load and store commands, and symPc(se), produced when symbolically evaluating branching instructions, where se is a symbolic expression. In our symbolic semantics, we use the observations symPc(se) to represent the symbolic path condition indicating when a path is feasible. Given a sequence of symbolic observations τ and a model µ, µ(τ ) denotes the concrete trace obtained by evaluating all symbolic observations different from symPc(se) under µ.
Symbolic non-speculative semantics. We model the symbolic non-speculative semantics of a program p using the relation − → s , which we fully formalize in Appendix C. Figure 7 depicts some selected rules.
The rule LOAD-SYMB executes load x, e instructions where the memory address in e evaluates to a symbolic expression se. The rule produces the symbolic observation loadO se and sets value of the register x to read(sm, se).
In contrast, the rule STORE-SYMB executes store x, e instructions. The rule records the memory access with the observation storeO se. It also updates the symbolic memory sm by recording the write operation write(sm, se, sa(x)).
Finally, the rule BEQZ-SYMB-1 executes branch instructions beqz x, n whose condition is satisfied, i.e., the symbolic value associated with x evaluates to 0. The rule sets Symbolic speculative semantics. The symbolic speculative semantics is captured by the relation s in Figure 8 .
The rule SE-NOBRANCH symbolically executes all nonbranching instructions. The rule is similar to its non-symbolic counterpart, and it delegates the computation to the symbolic non-speculative semantics.
The rule SE-BRANCH-SYMB symbolically executes branching instructions. The rule uses the non-speculative semantics to execute the instruction. Afterwards, it mimics the behavior of the "always mispredict" oracle by setting the program counter to the branch not taken by the non-speculative semantics. The rule uses the auxiliary function mispred (p, σ, n), where p is a program, σ is a configuration, and n is an instruction label, to mis-predict the program counter. That is, for a branch instruction beqz x, n, when the branch target is n, mispred returns σ(pc) + 1 (i.e., predicts the branch to be not taken), and when the branch target is σ(pc) + 1, mispred predicts the branch to be taken and returns n. Formally, mispred (p, σ, n) = σ(pc) + 1 and mispred (p, σ, σ(pc) + 1) = n whenever p(σ(pc)) = beqz x, n.
The rule SE-ROLLBACK handles the roll-back of speculative transactions. Since we target the "always mispredict" oracle, speculative transactions are always rolled back. Hence, there is no need to check whether the prediction is correct. Observe also that there is no rule for committing transactions.
Computing symbolic runs and traces. We now fix the symbolic values. The set SymbVals consists of a symbolic value x s for each register identifier x and of a symbolic value mem n s for each memory address n. We also fix the initial symbolic memory sm 0 = λn ∈ N. m n s and the symbolic assignment sa 0 such that sa 0 (pc) = 0 and sa 0 (x) = x s .
The set p, O s contains all runs that can be derived using the symbolic speculative semantics starting from the initial configuration sm 0 , sa 0 . That is, p, O s contains all triples sm 0 , sa 0 , τ, σ , where τ is a symbolic trace and σ is a final symbolic configuration, corresponding to symbolic computations 0, sm 0 , sa 0 , ε τ * s ctr , σ , ε where the path condition symPc(se)∈τ se is satisfiable.
We compute p, O s in the standard way. We keep track of a symbolic path constraint P C and we update it whenever the semantics produces an observation symPc(se). We start the computation from 0, sm 0 , sa 0 , ε and P C = . Whenever we execute the rule SE-BRANCH-SYMB, we explore all branches that are consistent with the current P C, and, for each of them, we update P C.
The set traces(p) contains all symbolic traces produced by the program p, and it is {τ | ∃σ, σ . σ, τ, σ ∈ p, O s }.
Concrete and symbolic semantics. Proposition 2 links the concrete and the symbolic semantics. It states that (1) all the concretizations of a symbolic run correspond to concrete runs, and (2) each concrete run is captured by some symbolic run. Example 7. Executing the program from Example 1 under the symbolic speculative semantics with the "always mispredict" oracle with speculative window 2 leads to the following symbolic traces: t s 1 := symPc(y s < size s ) · start 0 · pcO 2 · pcO 10 · rollback 0 · pcO 3 · loadO A s + y s · loadO read(sm 0 , B s +(A s +y s ) * 512) and t s 2 := symPc(y s ≥ size s ) · start 0 · pcO 3 · loadO A s + y s · loadO read(sm 0 , B s + (A s + y s ) * 512) · rollback 0 · pcO 2 · pcO 10. The trace t s 1 is produced whenever the bound check is satisfied, that is, under the condition in s < bound s . The trace t s 2 , instead, captures the program's behavior when the bound check is not satisfied, i.e., in s ≥ bound s .
B. Checking speculative non-interference
SPECTECTOR is shown in Algorithm 1. It relies on the two procedures CHECK MEM LEAK and CHECK CTRL LEAK to detect leaks resulting from memory accesses and from control-flow instructions, respectively. We start by discussing the high-level SPECTECTOR algorithm and next explain the CHECK MEM LEAK and CHECK CTRL LEAK procedures.
SPECTECTOR. SPECTECTOR takes as input a program p and a policy P specifying the non-sensitive information. The algorithms iterates over all symbolic traces produced by the symbolic speculative semantics (line 3). For each trace τ , the algorithm checks whether τ speculatively leaks information through memory accesses (lines 3-4) or control-flow instructions (lines 5-6). If this is the case, then SPECTECTOR has found a counterexample to p's security and it flags p as INSECURE. If SPECTECTOR analyses all traces without finding leaks, it terminates by returning SECURE. return SATISFIABLE(ψ) 11: procedure CHECK CTRL LEAK(τ, P ) 12:
for each prefix ν · symPc(se) of τ se do 13: ψ ← pthCnd (τ nse · ν) ∧ polEqv (P )∧ obsEqv (τ nse ) ∧ ¬sameSymbPc(se) 14: if SATISFIABLE(ψ) then 15: return 16: return ⊥
We remark that considering only the symbolic speculative traces is sufficient, since the non-speculative traces can always be derived from the speculative ones (cf. Proposition 1).
Detecting leaks caused by memory accesses. The procedure CHECK MEM LEAK takes as input a speculative trace τ and a policy P and determines whether τ may leak information through symbolic load and store observations. CHECK MEM LEAK reduces this task to checking the satisfiability of a symbolic constraint ψ. This is inspired by approaches for proving a program's non-interference using self-composition [23] . That is, the formula ψ models the values of two possible concretizations of τ . As is standard in selfcomposition [23] , given a symbolic constraint se, we write se 1 (respectively se 2 ) to denote the constraint obtained by replacing each symbolic variable x with x 1 (respectively x 2 ). Variables with subscript 1 refer to the first concretization of τ , while variables with subscript 2 refer to the second concretization.
To construct the symbolic formula ψ, the procedure relies on the auxiliary functions pthCnd (τ ), obsEqv (τ ), and polEqv (P ). The function pthCnd (τ ) derives a constraint representing the path conditions that must be satisfied by both concretizations of τ . The path condition is obtained by conjoining se 1 ∧ se 2 for all symPc(se) in τ . In contrast, obsEqv (τ ) ensures that the observations associated with memory accesses are the same across the two concretizations. This is obtained by introducing a constraint se 1 = se 2 for each loadO se or storeO se in τ . Finally, polEqv (P ) ensures that the concretizations agree on the non-sensitive values in the policy P .
CHECK MEM LEAK computes τ 's non-speculative projection τ nse , which is obtained from τ by removing all substrings start id · τ · rollback id . Additionally, the procedure computes τ 's speculative projection τ se , which contains all the observations produced by rolled-back transactions. While τ se captures the leaks caused only by the speculatively executed instructions, τ nse models the leaks caused by the instructions that are executed with respect to the non-speculative semantics (cf. Proposition 1).
To detect leaks, CHECK MEM LEAK checks the satisfiability of the conjunction of pthCnd (τ ), polEqv (P ), obsEqv (τ nse ), and ¬obsEqv (τ se ). Whenever the formula is satisfied, there are two P -indistinguishable configurations that produce the same non-speculative traces (since obsEqv (τ nse ) is satisfied) but whose speculative traces differ in a memory access observation (since ¬obsEqv (τ se ) is satisfied). Hence, speculative non-interference is violated.
Detecting leaks caused by control-flow instructions. To detect leaks caused by the outcome of branch and jump instructions (i.e., by pcO n observations), CHECK CTRL LEAK looks for two possible concretizations of τ that differ in the value of an observation symPc(se) in τ 's speculative projection. Since such a difference directly implies a difference in the program counter and, therefore, in the executed code, CHECK CTRL LEAK compares prefixes of the speculative projection of τ .
In addition to the auxiliary functions pthCnd (τ ), obsEqv (τ ), and polEqv (P ), the procedure also relies on the auxiliary function sameSymbPc(se) that derives a constraint ensuring that the symbolic expression se is satisfied in one concretization iff it is satisfied in the other. That is, sameSymbPc(se) derives the constraint se 1 ↔ se 2 .
CHECK CTRL LEAK checks, for each prefix ν · symPc(se) in τ 's speculative projection τ se , the satisfiability of the conjunction of pthCnd (τ nse ·ν), polEqv (P ), obsEqv (τ nse ), and ¬(se 1 ↔ se 2 ). If the formula is satisfiable for one of the prefixes, CHECK CTRL LEAK detects a speculative leak and returns . Whenever the formula is satisfied, there are two P -indistinguishable configurations that produce the same non-speculative traces, but whose speculative traces differ on program counter observations. Again, this violates speculative non-interference.
Correctness. Theorem 1 states that if SPECTECTOR proves a program secure, the program is speculatively non-interferent. Theorem 1. Whenever SPECTECTOR(p, P ) = SECURE, the program p satisfies speculative non-interference with respect to the "always mispredict" oracle with window w and the policy P .
Proof. If SPECTECTOR(p, P ) = SECURE, for all symbolic traces τ , CHECK MEM LEAK(τ ) = ⊥ and CHECK CTRL LEAK(τ ) = ⊥. Let σ and σ be two arbitrary P -indistinguishable initial configurations producing the same concrete non-speculative trace τ . From Proposition 1.(b), σ and σ produce two concrete speculative traces τ c and τ c with the same non-speculative projection. From Propositions 2.(b), τ c and τ c correspond to two symbolic traces τ s and τ s . Since CHECK CTRL LEAK(τ s ) = ⊥, CHECK CTRL LEAK(τ s ) = ⊥, and τ c nse = τ c nse , speculatively executed control-flow instructions produce the same outcome in τ c and τ c . Hence, the same code is executed in both traces and τ s = τ s . From CHECK MEM LEAK(τ s ) = ⊥, the observations produced by speculatively executed load and store instructions are the same. Thus, τ c = τ c . Hence, whenever two initial configurations produce the same non-speculative traces, then they produce the same speculative traces. Therefore, p satisfies speculative non-interference. Theorem 2 states that the leaks found by SPECTECTOR are valid counterexamples to speculative non-interference. Theorem 2. Whenever SPECTECTOR(p, P ) = INSECURE, the program p does not satisfy speculative non-interference with respect to the "always mispredict" oracle with window w and the policy P .
Proof. If SPECTECTOR(p, P ) = INSECURE, there is a symbolic trace τ for which either CHECK MEM LEAK(τ ) = or CHECK CTRL LEAK(τ ) = . In the first case, pthCnd (τ ) ∧ polEqv (P ) ∧ obsEqv (τ nse ) ∧ ¬obsEqv (τ se ) is satisfiable. Then, there are two models for the symbolic trace τ that (1) satisfy the path condition encoded in τ , (2) agree on the non-sensitive registers and memory locations in P , (3) produce the same non-speculative projection, and (4) the speculative projections differ on a load or store observation. From Proposition 2.(a), the two concretizations correspond to two concrete runs, with different traces, whose non-speculative projection are the same. By combining this with Proposition 1.(a), there are two configurations that produce the same non-speculative trace but different speculative traces. This is a violation of speculative non-interference.
In the second case, there is a prefix ν · symPc(se) of τ se such that pthCnd (τ nse · ν) ∧ polEqv (P ) ∧ obsEqv (τ nse ) ∧ ¬(se 1 ↔ se 2 ) is satisfiable. Hence, there are two symbolic traces τ and τ that produce the same non-speculative observations but differ on a program counter observation pcO n in their speculative projections. Again, this implies, through Propositions 2.(a) and 1.(a), that there are two Pindistinguishable initial configurations producing the same non-speculative traces but distinct speculative traces, leading to a violation of speculative non-interference. 
C. Implementation
We implemented Algorithm 1 on top of the CIAO logic programming system [24] and an interface to external SMTLIB compatible SMT solvers. SPECTECTOR is available at https://spectector.github.io. x86 front-end. SPECTECTOR analyzes µASM programs. To analyze x86 programs, we developed a front-end that translates (a fragment of) the x86 instruction set into µASM. The tool supports both AT&T/GAS and Intel style assembly files.
Our front-end covers a subset of x86 instructions. It supports instructions for copying data between registers and memory (mov, etc.), logical and arithmetic instructions (xor, add, etc.), branching and jumping instructions (jae, jmp, etc.), as well as conditional moves (cmovae, etc.). Additionally, we model the update of flag bits for both signed and unsigned integer comparisons (e.g., CF, ZF, SF) resulting from comparison instructions, like cmp and test, and logical and arithmetic instructions. Finally, our tool supports push and pop instructions for accessing the stack, and it supports function calls using call and ret instructions. The front-end supports 64-bit registers and a 64-bit address space. Front-end limitations. Our translation, however, makes some simplifications. First, we support neither sub-registers (like eax, ah, and al) nor unaligned memory accesses, i.e., we assume that only 64-bit words are read/written at each address without overlaps. Second, the program instructions are not stored in the main memory. That is, code is not self-readable or self-modifiable. Finally, our implementation of call and ret instructions only models the so-called "near calls", where the called function is in the same code segment as the instruction pointed by the program counter. These limitations do not affect the results we present in Section VII. A more accurate translation seems feasible with moderate effort. While it would imply more involved symbolic traces, we do not expect that it could negatively affect the scalability of the tool.
Checking constraint satisfiability. Our implementation uses the Z3 SMT solver [19] to check the satisfiability of symbolic constraints over the theories of Arrays and Bitvectors. This allows us to precisely reason about memory configurations and operations over 64-bit words. The solver is invoked during the computation of symbolic traces as well as in the CHECK MEM LEAK and CHECK CTRL LEAK procedures.
VII. CASE STUDIES
Here, we report the results of using SPECTECTOR to analyze a corpus of 210 programs, which are obtained from the 15 variants of the SPECTRE v1 attack by Kocher [17] .
A. Experimental setup
For our analysis, we rely on three state-of-the-art compilers: CLANG v7.0.0, Intel ICC v19.0.0.117, and Microsoft VISUAL C++ v19.15.26732.1.
We compile the programs using two different optimization levels (-O0 and -O2) and three mitigation levels:
• Unpatched (UNP): we compile without any SPECTRE mitigations. • With fences (FEN): we compile with automated injection of speculation barriers. 4 • Speculative load hardening (SLH): we compile using speculative load hardening. 5 We compile each of the 15 examples from [17] with each of the 3 compilers, each of the 2 optimization levels, and each of the 2-3 mitigation levels, obtaining a corpus of 210 x64 assembly programs. 6 For each of these programs, we manually specify a security policy that flags as "low" all registers and memory locations that can either be controlled by the attacker or can be assumed to be public. This includes variables y and size, and the base addresses of the arrays A and B as well as the stack pointer. Figure 9 depicts the results of applying SPECTECTOR to the 210 examples. We highlight the following findings: 4 Insertion of fences is supported by CLANG with the flag -x86-speculative-load-hardening-lfence, by ICC with -mconditional-branch=all-fix, and by VISUAL C++ with /Qspectre 5 Speculative load hardening is supported by CLANG with the flag -x86-speculative-load-hardening. 6 The resulting assembly files are available at https:// spectector.github.io.
B. Experimental Results
• SPECTECTOR detects the speculative leaks in almost all unprotected programs, for all compilers (see the UNP columns). The exception is Example #8, which uses a conditional expression instead of the if statement of Figure 1 With optimization level -O0, this is translated by all compilers to a (vulnerable) branch instruction, and with level -O2 to a (safe) conditional move, thus closing the leak. See Appendix D-A for the corresponding CLANG assembly.
• The CLANG and Intel ICC compilers defensively insert fences after each branch instruction, and SPECTECTOR can prove security for all cases (see the FEN columns for CLANG and ICC). In Example #8 with options -O2 and FEN, ICC inserts an lfence instruction, even though the baseline relies on a conditional move, see line 10 below. This lfence is unnecessary according to our semantics, but may close leaks on CPUs that speculate over conditional moves. [17] . Our analysis differs from Kocher's only on Example #8, where the latest version of the compiler introduces a safe conditional move, as explained above. Moreover, when using -O0 (which is not considered in [17] ), SPECTECTOR can establish the security of Examples 3 and 5.
• SPECTECTOR can prove the security of speculative load hardening in Clang (see the SLH column for CLANG), except for Example 10 and 15 with -O2.
We now discuss speculative load hardening in more detail. Example 10 with Speculative Load Hardening: Example #10 differs from the example in Figure 1 in that it leaks sensitive information into the microarchitectural state by conditionally reading the content of B[0], depending on the value of A[y]. SPECTECTOR proves the security of the program produced with CLANG -O0 and speculative load hardening. However, with -O2, CLANG outputs the following code that SPECTECTOR reports as insecure.
Ex. ICC  CLANG   UNP  FEN  UNP  FEN  UNP  FEN  SLH -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 -O0 -O2 The reason for this is that CLANG masks only the register %rbx that contains the index of the memory access A[y], cf. lines 6-7. However, it does not mask the value that is read from A[y]. As a result, the comparison at line 9 speculatively leaks (via the jump target) whether the content of A[0xFF...FF] is k. SPECTECTOR detects this subtle leak and flags a violation of speculative noninterference.
VISUAL C++
While this example nicely illustrates the scope of SPECTEC-TOR, it is likely not a problem in practice. First, the attacker can only determine one bit of information about the content of a fixed memory location. Second, the leak may be mitigated by the way data dependencies are handled in modern out-oforder processors. Specifically, the conditional move in line 6 relies on outcome of the comparison in line 4. If executing the conditional move effectively terminates speculation, the reported leak is spurious.
Example #15 follows a similar pattern (albeit with -O2 and -O0 exchanged). The interested reader is referred to Appendix D-A1 for more information.
C. Performance
We run all experiments on a Linux machine with kernel 4.9.0-8-amd64 running Debian 9.0, with a Xeon Gold 6154 CPU, and 64 GB of RAM. We use the CIAO compiler version 1.18 and the Z3 SMT solver version 4.8.4.
The SPECTECTOR implementation terminates within less than 30 seconds on all of our examples, except for Example #5 in modes SLH -O0 and SLH -O2 for CLANG and mode FEN -O0 for ICC (with several examples being analyzed in about 0.1 seconds). In the exceptional cases, SPECTECTOR consumes 1-2 minutes for proving security. After manually inspecting the code, we believe this is due to the path explosion caused by Example #5's complex control-flow, which may lead to loops involving several branch instructions.
VIII. DISCUSSION

A. Exploitability
In practice, exploiting speculative execution attacks require an adversary to (1) trigger mis-speculation for a sufficiently large time window, (2) encode information into the microarchitectural state, and (3) decode the leaked information afterwards. SPECTECTOR is exclusively concerned with identifying code that enables (2) . In particular, following the terminology of [25] , speculative non-interference is a semantic characterization of those disclosure gadgets that encode more information than what the standard semantics allows.
For minimizing the placement of performance-degrading countermeasures, compilers try to account also for criteria (1) and (3) . Integrating these criteria into a semantic definition of security is a challenge for future work.
B. Scope of Model
The results obtained by SPECTECTOR are only valid to the extent that the speculative semantics in conjunction with the "constant-time" observer model accurately captures the additional leakage induced by speculative execution.
In particular, SPECTECTOR may incorrectly classify a program as secure if the speculative semantics does not implicitly 7 capture all the additional observations an attacker may make due to speculative execution on an actual microarchitecture. For example, it would in principle be conceivable for microarchitectures to speculate on the value of the condition of a conditional update, which our speculative semantics currently does not permit.
Similarly, a secure program could be classified as insecure if the speculative semantics admits speculative executions that are not actually possible on an actual microarchitecture. This might be the case under speculative load hardening in Paul Kocher's Examples 10 and 15, as discussed in Section VII.
We note, however, that the speculative semantics can always be adapted to more accurately reflect reality, once better documentation of processor behavior becomes available. The notion of speculative non-interference itself is robust to such changes, as it is defined relative to the speculative semantics.
We capture "leakage into the microarchitectural state" using the relatively powerful "constant-time" observer of the program execution that sees the location of memory accesses and the location of jump targets. This observer could be replaced by a weaker one, taking into account more detailed models of a processor's memory hierarchy, and SPECTECTOR could be adapted accordingly. We believe, however, that highly detailed models are not actually desirable for several reasons: (a) they encourage brittle designs that break under small changes to the model, (b) they have to be adapted frequently, and (c) they are hard to understand and reason about for compiler developers and hardware engineers. The "constant-time" observer model adopted in this paper has proven to offer a good tradeoff between precision and robustness [14] , [15] .
C. Limitations of Automation
Complexity. SPECTECTOR symbolically executes programs to derive all possible symbolic traces. Whenever the program under analysis contains large, complex execution paths, SPEC-TECTOR may not terminate due to the path explosion problem that affects symbolic execution. Another source of computational complexity is checking the satisfiability of symbolic expressions. Even though we restrict ourselves to the decidable theories of bitvectors and arrays, determining the satisfiability of symbolic expressions may still be computationally challenging (or lead to non-termination). Nevertheless, SPECTECTOR is able to reason about all the 210 programs in our case studies. Additionally, the implementation can be easily extended to work with specialized theories and alternative solvers. Prediction oracles. SPECTECTOR currently supports only the "always mispredict" oracle, which always mispredicts the outcome of branch instructions. This oracle has been implicitly used in prior work [13] since it is often the worst-case scenario in terms of leakage (it always speculatively execute the wrong branch before backtracking and executing the correct one). We remark that the prediction oracle is a key component of the security analysis, as it affects which instructions are speculatively executed. Hence, changing the prediction oracle may modify SPECTECTOR's results.
IX. RELATED WORK
Speculative execution attacks. These attacks exploit the effects of speculatively executed instructions to leak information. After SPECTRE [2] , [4] , [6] , a number of speculative execution attacks have been discovered that differ in the exploited speculation sources [1] , [5] , [18] , the covert channels [26] , [3] , [27] used, or the target platforms [28] . We refer the reader to [29] for a survey of speculative execution attacks and their countermeasures.
Here, we overview only SPECTRE v1 software-level countermeasures. AMD and Intel suggested inserting lfence instructions after branches [7] , [30] . These instructions effectively act as speculation barriers, and prevent speculation leaks. The Intel C++ compiler [10] , the Microsoft Visual C++ compiler [11] , and CLANG [12] can automatically inject this countermeasure at compile time. An alternative technique that has been proposed is to introduce artificial data dependencies [31] , [9] . Speculative Load Hardening (SLH) [9] , implemented in the CLANG compiler [12], employs carefully injected data dependencies and masking operations to prevent the leak of sensitive information into the microarchitectural state. A third software-level countermeasure consists in replacing branching instructions by other computations, like bit masking, that do not trigger speculative execution [32] . This countermeasure cannot be automatically applied to arbitrary programs. Detecting speculative leaks. oo7 [13] is a binary analysis tool for detecting speculative leaks. The tool looks for specific vulnerable code patterns. Hence, it misses some speculative leaks, like Example 4 from Section VII. oo7 would also incorrectly classify all the programs patched by SLH in our case studies as insecure, since they still match oo7's vulnerable patterns. In contrast, SPECTECTOR builds on our semantic notion of security against speculative attacks. As a result, it can detect speculative leaks or prove their absence.
Disselkoen et al. [33] present an execution model supporting speculation and use it to model SPECTRE attacks. They neither provide a security notion nor a detection technique. Formal architecture models. Armstrong et al. [34] present formal models for the ARMv8-A, RISC-V, MIPS, and CHERI-MIPS instruction-set architectures. Degenbaev [35] and Goel et al. [36] develop formal models for parts of the x86 architecture. Such models enable e.g. the formal verification of compilers, operating systems, and hypervisors. However, ISA models naturally abstract from microarchitectural aspects such as speculative execution or caches, which are required to reason about side-channel vulnerabilities. Static detection of side-channel vulnerabilities. A number of approaches have been proposed for statically detecting sidechannel vulnerabilities in programs [37] , [38] , [39] . These differ from our work in that (1) they do not consider speculative execution, and (2) we exclusively target speculation leaks, i.e., we ignore leaks from the standard semantics. However, we note that our tool could easily be adapted to also detect leaks from the standard semantics.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We introduce speculative non-interference, the first semantic notion of security against speculative execution attacks. Based on this notion we develop SPECTECTOR, a tool for automatically detecting speculative leaks or proving their absence, and we show how it can be used to detect subtle leaksand optimization opportunities-in the way state-of-the-art compilers apply SPECTRE mitigations.
APPENDIX A NON-SPECULATIVE SEMANTICS
Given a µASM program p ∈ Prg, we formalise its semantics using the evaluation relation − →⊆ Conf × Obs × Conf defined in Figure 10 .
APPENDIX B SPECULATIVE AND NON-SPECULATIVE PROJECTIONS
Here, we formalize the speculative projection τ se and the non-speculative projection τ nse .
Non-speculative projection. Given a trace τ produced by the speculative semantics, its non-speculative projection contains only the observations that are produced by committed transactions; in other words, rolled-back transactions are removed in the projection. Formally, τ nse is defined as follows: ε nse = ε, (o · τ ) nse = o · τ nse if o is loadO se, storeO se, pcO n, or symPc(se), (start i · τ ) nse = τ nse if rollback i is not in τ , (commit i · τ ) nse = τ nse , (start i · τ · rollback i · τ ) nse = τ nse , and τ nse = ε otherwise.
Speculative projection. Given a speculative trace τ , its speculative projection contains only the observations produced by rolled-back transactions. Formally, τ se is defined as: ε se = ε, (o · τ ) se = τ se if o is loadO se, storeO se, pcO n, or symPc(se), (start i · τ ) se = τ se if rollback i is not in τ , (commit i·τ ) se = τ se , (start i·τ ·rollback i· τ ) se = filter (τ ) · τ nse , and τ nse = ε otherwise, where filter (τ ) denotes the trace obtained by dropping all extended observations start id , commit id , and rollback id from τ . Symbolic non-speculative semantics. We formalize the symbolic non-speculative semantics for a µASM program p using the relation − → s defined in Figure 11 .
APPENDIX C SYMBOLIC SEMANTICS
Expression evaluation n (a) = n x (a) = a(x) e (a) = e (a) e 1 ⊗ e 2 (a) = e 1 (a) ⊗ e 2 (a) 
Instruction evaluation
